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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROYDEN V. CARTER, i 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
SHIRLEY HANRATH and MAGDALENE . 
STEVENS, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
: Case No. 930554-CA 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE ROYDEN V. CARTER 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to the 
provisions of Article VIII of the Utah Constitution; Utah Code 
Annotated §78-22-3(2)(k), 1953 as amended; and Rule 3 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court was correct in finding that the 
disputed parcel was encompassed by visible boundary lines marked by 
valid monuments and fence lines, 
2. Whether the trial court was correct in concluding as a 
matter of law that a boundary by acquiescence was established by 
the parties and their predecessors. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for all issues of law presented on 
appeal herein is one of assessment for correctness. State v. Rio 
Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1342 (Utah, 1990). The standard of 
review where the trial court's factual findings are challenged is 
the clearly erroneous standard. Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah, 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee adopts and incorporates by reference herein the 
Statement of the Case as set forth in Appellant's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The brevity of the facts set forth in Defendant's Brief 
necessitates further amplification. 
The property in dispute is located along the banks of the 
Duchesne River approximately 18 miles north and west of Duchesne, 
Utah (TR. 80, 116). It is bordered on the south by the north line 
of Section 20, Township 2 South, Range 6 West, Uintah Special Base 
and Meridian,and on the north by ledges and cliffs (TR. 12). The 
distance between the said section line and the ledges and cliffs is 
approximately 7 00 feet. The Duchesne River, which varies in width 
from 250 feet to 200 yards, bisects the property from west to east 
in an area south and adjacent or in close proximity to said ledges 
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and cliffs (TR. 35, 72, 84, 141, 201 and 202). 
1964, the Plaintiff and hi: brother, :arter, 
negot:,;.;.-ad a pin chase of proper ty f ••• + * " '.- ana] p, 
et.ux, who had been the owner of said property for :. . 0 . 1 thirty 
years prior thereto (TR. 66 and 142). Thereafter i i n May, 1969, 
0 ;' - • * *< • y " (TR , 37, 38 
and : *' the time ^1 purchaser, rlaintii f inspected the 
property purchased from Abplanalp and found the same to be 
rectanquiai 111 i;!iapo with «i fronhiqe nn I \\(-\ 1101 1 h • -. i ci <r* nt a state 
highway enclosed by fence running parallel thereto and old 
established fence lines which extended north along the East and 
West boi 11 ldari es : >f sai d tract to tl le ] edges and c] :i ffs ] ocated c i: 1 
the north side of the Duchesne River (TR. 73, 75, 85, 86, 1 40 am i 
141) (EX. 12). 
Inspect:] 01 1 and 2 nvestigati 01 1 fi irti ie:i : revealed that tl le sai d 
Abplanalp had acguired the property many years ago from his wife's 
family who had been long time residents and owners of said property 
( 
Investigation further revealed that the land enclosed within 
the fences and cliffs above described had historical" . jjeen 
occupied ai id 1 isecl as a single c] a i med ownershi p for agr icul T P and 
stock raising; that many years ago a barn and stack yard had been 
constructed ^nn existed along the south side of the Duchesne River 
•;}:•... thp disputed area which has 
continued in use (TR. 29, 33, ;. , 120-125, 127, 130 and 142). 
4 
After purchase by the Plaintiff, the property continued to be 
occupied and used for agriculture and stock raising (TR. 39, 130, 
143 and 144). The fence lines which formed the east and west 
boundaries of the property were anchored into the ledges and said 
ledges formed a natural boundary and barrier (TR. 134, 145-147). 
Livestock relied upon access to the river as the source of water 
(TR. 67, 144). 
Approximately 55 acres of the property acquired by Carter 
extended north to the Duchesne River and was devoted to the raising 
of alfalfa with the remainder used as irrigated pasture and "cow-
calf" operation (TR.93-95, 130, 144). 
Plaintiff did not know of the true location of the north line 
of Section 2 0 aforesaid, and has never had the property surveyed 
(TR. 74, 75 and 152), and always assumed the boundary of the 
property to be within the confines of the fences and ledges 
aforesaid (TR. 64). 
The predecessors in interest of the Defendant Hanrath, 
acquired a deed to property described as the Southeast quarter of 
Section 17, Township 2 South, Range 6 West, Uintah Special Base and 
Meridian in 1961 (TR. 162, 163)(Exs. 17 and 20). The total tract 
was 160 acres and at least 80% was located in a plateau above the 
Duchesne River with approximately 20% located in the ledges and 
area of the Duchesne River. Access to the major portion of the 
property (80%) was on top of the plateau located above the Duchesne 
River and the remainder of the property located in and below the 
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ledges was landlocked (TR. 1 0 6 ) . 
The said predecessors in interest inspected :.• property 
t »no ".' si«in i n l T / 4 MI I O /S i T N I I.O I . -iM I • " 
land .. dispute was landlocked, had no access i nc ~iiat livestock 
was being pastured in the area (TR. 168, 1 9 1 ) . 
The Defendants, Ha nratl I and s tev ens, acqi :i i red a deed to tl le 
Southeast quarter of Section 17 aforesaid, August of 1986 (TR. 
2 8 8 ) . (Ex. 2 5 ) . At the time of purchase i:-y caid Defendants, they 
were awai -e < :)f the existence of the o] d establ ished fence ] I nes ai id 
that Plaintiff Carter and his predecessors in interest had 
exclusively occupied, improved, developed and claimed ownership of 
••*.
 :
 .;•:'.• •: ::o i ancient fence lines and 
the ledges and cliffs (TR. 43-54, :;•:()-* :: \{V:x:'r • I-i inclusive). 
Neighbors in the area have similarly reco-: /zed th 
"i : :] 3 f fs 1 \ ' II H ! i K >i 1 1 I of t i le Duchesne River as constituting a natural 
boundary (R. 24^, 252-253). 
* was not until the Defendants cau. 
L.98f hat a d , ancy between the survey ;:,e wiiu •. . 
established boundaries was asserted for the first time (TR. 39, 
2 4 7 f 2 50), At nc time prior thereto had any di spute exi sted v 
challMjqed t lit* oh . ence lines and 1 edges as being the boundary v.-," 
the property (TR. 3 8, 13 0 , 15 7) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case turns on whether the occupation of the disputed 
parcel by Appellee and his predecessors in interest satisfy the 
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requirements contained in Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah, 
1990) to establish a boundary by acquiescence. Of the four 
elements contained in Staker, the first two are the only ones at 
issue, to-wit: 
1. Occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, 
fences or buildings; 
2. Mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary. 
Appellee contends that the evidence clearly established that 
the disputed parcel was encompassed by clearly visible fence lines 
and definite monuments in the form of ledges and cliffs which were 
used and recognized as one portion of the boundary. Further, said 
ledges and cliffs constitute a natural monument for the purpose of 
establishing a boundary. 
With respect to the element of acquiescence, there is no 
requirement that there be either express or implied intent by the 
parties establishing the boundary. Rather, acquiescence may be 
established by indolence or consent by silence. Such indolence and 
silence were present here establishing acquiescence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
OCCUPATION OF DISPUTED PARCEL IS BOUNDED BY 
VISIBLE FENCE LINES AND MONUMENTS 
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has long been 
accepted by the courts of this state as well as other 
jurisdictions. The most recent pronouncement of this doctrine by 
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the Utah Supreme Court together with the elements which are 
required are stated in the case of Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 
417 (Utah, 1990)- Those elements are: 
] . Occupation up to a visible line marked ^v 
monuments, fences, or buildings; 
? Mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary; 
For a long period of time; and 
4 . tsy a-; . ^  • : r-^nw\oi r;. 
See also: Goodman v. Wilkinson, 629 P. 2d 447, 448 (Utah, 
1981)• 
As stated in the Hanrath's brief, there is no dispute that the 
third and fourth elements have been met in this case. The issue 
t h e y h a v e r a i s e d mi .ippivil n, whrthi'i t lie u c c u p a t x o n ul t h e 
property is up .. visible line marked by monuments, fences or 
buildings and whether there has been acquiescence in the disputed 
1 i ne as the boi indary be tweei i the adjoi n i i lg parcels . 
With respect to the first issue, the record cleai.y indicates 
and the evidence established that the occupation OJ. ' si ibject 
p r o p e r t y b ^  r C a r t e r a n d 1 ) i s p r edecessors existed definite 
monuments and fence lines. The testimony and evidence established 
that the fence lines had been used and acknowledged as * 
west boundaries <>t: the subject property for a peri cc .: ui .cQi 
fifty years. 
With respect to the northern boundary, the ledger, find iitt 
clearly constitute a monument for the purposes of establishing that 
boundary. In Carr v. Schombera, 232 P.2d 597 (Cal. 1951), the 
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California Supreme Court was faced with a similar issue now before 
this Court in deciding whether a "tree line" constituted a 
sufficient monument for the purposes of establishing a boundary 
between two adjoining parcels. The Court held that "while the 
actual erection of a fence or like monument along an agreed 
boundary would have great weight in the fixing of such a boundary 
such means are not exclusive," The Court then went on to hold that 
the "tree line" constituted a sufficient monument for establishing 
a boundary. Also, it has been held that a "ledgey shore and creek" 
are natural monuments for the purposes of fixing boundaries. 
Burnham v. Hoit, 104 N.E. 62 (Mass.). Also, "permanent objects, 
such as streams, or rivers, and the shore of a lake, or highways, 
or other lands, or buildings, or stakes when referred to in the 
description of property conveyed, are known as 'monuments111. 
Temple v. Benson, 100 N.E. 63 (Mass.). 
Accordingly, there is no basis for contending that the 
northern boundary of the subject property which abuts the ledges 
and cliffs is not clearly established by "monuments". Therefore, 
Carter contends and submits that the first element to establish 
boundary by acquiescence has been met. 
POINT II. 
ACQUIESCENCE MAY BE ESTABLISHED BY INDOLENCE 
AND SILENCE OF PARTIES 
With respect to the issue of acquiescence, there is no 
requirement that the parties enter into an express agreement which 
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establishes the boundary. In Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corp., 530 
P.2d 7 92, 7 94 (Utah, 1975) the Utah Supreme Court held that: 
It should be clearly understood that our case 
law does not support, and that we do not agree 
with the proposition that a landowner can 
claim boundary solely on the basis of an oral 
agreement. From a reading of the cases, it 
will be seen that it requires the acceptance, 
or the giving of consent or approval, by words 
or conduct, over some substantial period of 
time and when certain requisites are met. 
instant case, the record clearly shows that the 
dispi • :.:*•• ••• i-:quiesced In .tod acknowledged i n the 
community for a period of at least fifty years prior to the 
initiation of this action. The subject parcel v property was used 
up lo the I once J J lies and 1 bo J edges ..;_;•-: .:::.. ; or that period 
time for livestock and other agricultural purposes, \s stated in 
Hobson, the acceptance of the boundaries need not be •*< s^ 
simply by way of conduct between the parties. The 
predecessors of both the Hanraths and Carter, by their conduct, 
established the boundaries and the use ol" f:he property extended ID 
those boi indaries for < i substantial period of time necessary to 
establish boundary by acquiescence. 
their brief, the Hanraths are urging this Court t;o adopl. 
"objed .i ve" or "subjective" tests in determining whether 
there was uncertainty or dispute as to whether there was boundary 
by acquiescence. However, the Utah ilupreme Court in Staker, supra, 
expressly overruled this additional fifth requirement which was set 
forth in the case of Halladav v. Cluff, 685 P.2d 500 (Utah, 1984) 
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and the line of cases which followed Halladav which adopted the 
requirement of this fifth element. In Staker, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that the Halladay decision together with the other 
decisions following that precedent caused a great deal of confusion 
and controversy among judges, lawyers and landowners in this state. 
Staker at 422. This confusion arose from the Court's use of the 
doctrines "boundary by acquiescence" and "boundary by agreement" as 
being practically interchangeable. In Staker, the Utah Supreme 
Court sought to remedy the confusion caused by the requirement that 
there be an agreement using either an objective or subjective 
standard and reiterated and reestablished the four basic and 
fundamental elements listed above to establish boundary by 
acquiescence. 
The Staker opinion follows earlier decisions of our Supreme 
Court which do not require any showing of either express or implied 
"intent" that the parties use a disputed boundary in order to 
establish "boundary by acquiescence." In Lane v. Walker, 505 P.2d 
1199, 1200 (Utah, 1973), the Court held that: 
[T]he test to establish the boundary by 
"acquiescence" necessarily need not be based 
on mutual "intent." "Intent" is not 
synonymous with "acquiescence" in these cases. 
"Acquiescence" is more nearly synonymous with 
"indolence" or "consent by silence",- or a 
knowledge that a fence or other monuments 
appears to be a boundary, - but that no one 
did anything about it for 48 years. (Emphasis 
added). 
In this case Carter and his predecessors used the parcel 
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within the disputed boundaries for at least 50 years and "no one 
did anything about it" until this action was commenced. Fences and 
structures were erected and used on the disputed parcel by Carter 
and his predecessors for at least 50 years and neither the Shraders 
nor their predecessors protested. Their "consent by silence" or 
"indolence" for such a long period of time is more than sufficient 
to establish the element of "acquiescence." 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellee submits that all of the 
elements to establish a boundary by acquiescence have been met and 
satisfied in this case. The property in question is bounded by 
clearly visible fence lines and natural monuments which have been 
used and recognized as the boundary for many years. The use of the 
property up to those boundaries has been acquiesced to by the 
Appellants and their predecessors for a sufficient period of time 
to establish a boundary by acquiescence. 
Accordingly, Appellee respectfully requests that the trial 
court's judgment be affirmed. 
RespectffuTTy Submitted, 
CORY R./ WALL 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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